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SEMI S2-0703a E © SEMI 1991, 2004 41 Potential Hazard Recommended Control Method Design Considerations Control of ignition sources. NFPA 70 (NEC) Class I, Div. 2 wiring methods, intrinsically safe components, or nitrogen…

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SEMI S2-0703a
E
© SEMI 1991, 2004 40
APPENDIX 3
DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR EQUIPMENT USING LIQUID CHEMICALS
— Design and Test Method Supplement Intended for Internal and
Third Party Evaluation Use
NOTICE: The material in this appendix is an official part of SEMI S2 and was approved by full letter ballot
procedures on December 15, 1999 by the North American Regional Standards Committee.
A3-1 Introduction
A3-1.1 This appendix provides specific technical
information relating to Section 23. In general, it
provides information on potential hazards,
recommended control methods, and design
considerations.
A3-1.2 This appendix is not intended to limit hazard
evaluation methods or control strategies (e.g., design
principles) employed by manufacturers. Alternative
methods are acceptable if they provide an equivalent
level of hazard control.
A3-1.3 This appendix is intended to be used as a
starting point for reference during equipment design.
An example would be during a formal hazard analysis
in a brainstorming session.
Table A3-1 Liquid Chemicals
Potential Hazard Recommended Control Method Design Considerations
Containment, control, and alarm
notification for spills, leaks or vapors.
Appropriately sized secondary containment (minimum 110%
volume of entire contents)
Equipment exhaust
Leak sensors to initiate auto shutdown.
Controlled access to chemical
containment areas.
Door/access cover interlocks that automatically depressurize the
area of the system being accessed.
Exposure to
operators
Control of access to point-of-
operation hazards.
Physical guarding/presence-sensing devices
Control of chemical delivery
pressure; control of residual
chemicals.
Depressurization upon system failure, interlock activation, or
normal shutdown
Transparent doors/covers allow visual inspection.
Exposure to
maintenance
personnel
Serviceability Built-in system purge and flush capabilities
System components accessible and easy to service.
Chemical resistance/compatibility
Appropriate materials used for equipment construction and
components.
General
equipment and
component
failure
Pressure rating
Pressurized systems designed to withstand 150% of maximum
foreseeable pressure, or provide a suitable relief valve.
Durable bulk chemical containers
Use of approved (e.g., DOT, UN Dangerous Goods) containers
in bulk distribution systems.
Control of pressurized vessels and
piping.
Provide visual pressure indicators with or without alarms.
Pressurized vessels and piping are designed and built to
recognized standards.
Spill control Automatic system pressure check prior to allowing dispense.
Use of normally closed valves on distribution lines.
Chemical
delivery system
leak
Drum change-out controls Over-fill sensors on chemical baths
Monitoring for excess flow.
Keyed and color-coded quick-connects
SEMI S2-0703a
E
© SEMI 1991, 2004 41
Potential Hazard Recommended Control Method Design Considerations
Control of ignition sources.
NFPA 70 (NEC) Class I, Div. 2 wiring methods, intrinsically
safe components, or nitrogen-purged enclosures
Physical separation of ignition sources and/or potentially
flammable atmospheres.
Use of low voltage to reduce the risk for ignition.
Control of static electricity (i.e., one
type of ignition source).
Maintain ground continuity
Fire
Heat/fire/chemical detection
Limiting concentrations of fuels and
oxidizers.
(No consensus for a specific recommendation at the time of
publication of this guideline.)
SEMI S2-0703a
E
© SEMI 1991, 2004 42
APPENDIX 4
IONIZING RADIATION TEST VALIDATION — Design and Test Method
Supplement Intended for Internal and Third Party Evaluation Use
NOTICE: The material in this appendix is an official part of SEMI S2 and was approved by full letter ballot
procedures on December 15, 1999 by the North American Regional Standards Committee.
A4-1 Introduction
A4-1.1 This appendix provides specific technical information relating to Section 24. In general, it provides
information on hazard evaluation methods, examples of control strategies, and test validation criteria.
A4-1.2 This appendix is not intended to limit hazard evaluation methods or control strategies (e.g. design
principles) employed by the manufacturers. Alternative methods are acceptable if they provide an equivalent level of
hazard control.
A4-1.3 Test validation criteria are generally referenced from the applicable internationally recognized standard. It is
the users responsibility to ensure that the most current revision of the standard (or its national equivalent) is used.
Table A4-1 Ionizing Radiation
Ionizing
Radiation Type
Emission Limit
microsievert/hr
(millirem/hr)
Test Method
X or Gamma Operator
2 Sv/hr
(0.2 mrem/hr)
Direct doserate measurement with an Ion Chamber (or equivalent) calibrated
to ± 10% of true doserate at the surface of the equipment (or at the closest
approach) in all areas where the operator may have access with the ionizing
radiation source active.
X or Gamma Maintenance and Service
10 Sv/hr
(1 mrem/hr)
Direct doserate measurement with an Ion Chamber (or equivalent) calibrated
to ± 10% of true doserate during simulated maintenance and service
procedures. Measurements should be made at the surface emitting the
ionizing radiation or the closest approach to the emitting surface with the
ionizing radiation source active.
NOTE: For these measurements, panels and/or shields should be removed
only if removal is required for maintenance or service activities.
A4-2 Basic Radiation Control Methods
Time — If the radiation field exists and it must be entered, then minimize the time spent in the field to minimize the
exposure to the individual. This gives a linear dose reduction.
Distance — If the radiation field is present, stay as far away form the source as possible to perform the required
tasks. Dose is reduced by the square of the distance from the source.
Shielding — If the radiation field is intense and the source is small, shielding the source is generally the most
practical.
Quantity — If there exists an opportunity to minimize the amount of radiation or radioactive material that is required
for the task, then the exposure can be minimized also.