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SEMI S2-0703a E © SEMI 1991, 2004 90 R14-9.2.3 During pre-ins pection, cont rol system commissioning pr otocols should be prepared . R14-9.2.4 If a safety analysis or safety case has been prepared for the specific in sta…

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R14-8.3.3 Fault Tolerant Equipment Control System With High Availability And Redundant Network — In Figures
R14-2 through R14-6, the FECS enters a safe-state condition if a failure should occur; however, the production
process would be interrupted. In order to increase the availability of the automation system and therefore avoid
process downtime resulting from control system faults as well as faults and errors of components such as the power
supply, the industrial controller, the network connection, and the I/O modules need to be made redundant. Possible
architectures (see Figure R14-7) for achieving high availability include 2 oo 2, 2 oo 3, 2 oo 4, etc. (see R14-Section
9). Using fail-to-safe and high availability systems, injury to people or environmental damage can be prevented and
the production process can be continued without interruption.
Figure R14-7
Fault-Tolerant Equipment Control System with High Availability FECS and Redundant Network
R14-9 Guide to Assessment and Test Methods
R14-9.1 Assessment and testing of an electronic system (especially programmable systems) for safety integrity
levels (SIL) according to IEC 61508/ANSI/ISA-84.01 or risk categories according to ISO 13849-1 (EN 954-1) is a
complex and time consuming task, requiring a considerable level of knowledge and expertise. The use of
components such as safety PLCs and safety networks, that are certified by third parties for use in systems, and
include specific SILs and risk categories, simplifies the process of assessing the whole system.
NOTE 9: Certified (or listed) components need to be certified for functional safety use in safety critical systems. The final
integrated system should be fully assessed; using tools such as IEC 61508/ANSI/ISA-84.01 or ISO 13849-1 (EN954-1).
Assessments can often simplified by using combinations of certified components or FECS.
R14-9.2 Commissioning and Site Approval — Commissioning and site approval as described in IEC 61508 may be
confusing and therefore the following criteria are necessary for understanding:
R14-9.2.1 Safety-related components should meet the safety requirements defined during the risk analysis.
NOTE 10: Use of Notified Bodies, ATLs or a Professional Engineer to perform system assessment, type approval/site
approval/commissioning of electronic components and for machinery with industrial controllers is defined by the jurisdiction of
use.
R14-9.2.2 During control system commissioning, all relevant documentation of the pre-inspection should be
available. A pre-inspection usually is the first phase of a control system commissioning.
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R14-9.2.3 During pre-inspection, control system
commissioning protocols should be prepared.
R14-9.2.4 If a safety analysis or safety case has been
prepared for the specific installation, all documents
regarding this activity should be made available.
R14-9.2.5 Whether a safety analysis or safety case has
been prepared or not, a directory of available
documents should be generated.
R14-9.2.5.1 This list should include the titles, dates
and number of pages of all documents.
R14-9.2.5.1.1 If possible, all documents should also be
available in electronic form.
R14-9.2.5.2 The documentation should include:
a. Safety Specification (if possible as formal
specification),
b. Top-level diagram of the application (1 or 2
pages),
c. Technical implementation (e.g. block, flow
and timing diagrams),
d. Explanation of separation between safety
critical and not safety critical parts of the
application,
e. Safety handbooks of the system components
(safety handbooks of the safety controllers,
sensors and actuators),
f. Description of interfaces,
g. Specification of all safety relevant program
parts,
h. I/O documentation,
i. Software program documentation,
j. Wiring documents,
k. Diagram and listing of the interaction
between input- and output-data (e.g. safety
matrix, cause-effect diagrams or comparable
documents),
l. Cross reference listing,
m. Source programs on storage medium, and
n. Description of the procedure to verify, that
the documentation, respectively the files on
the storage medium, are identical to the
programs in the application (upload verify,
CRC checksums, or comparable).
R14-10 Safety Performance
R14-10.1 For details on how to achieve the necessary
safety system requirements, see ISO 13849.
NOTE 11: An update of document IEC 62061 is currently
under preparation, and it should be consulted for further
details.
R14-11 Application Examples
R14-11.1 Safety is important in semiconductor
equipment (especially in the area of wafer fabrication)
where toxic media (e.g. gases or chemicals), high-speed
motion, or lasers may be present. The following are
examples of some wafer fabrication equipment which
could be adapted to a FECS:
a. CVD
b. Cleaning Equipment
c. CMP
d. Diffusion/Oxidation
e. Dry Etch Systems
f. Epitaxy
g. Ion Implantation
h. Lithography
i. Physical Vapor Deposition
j. Vacuum Deposition
k. Wet Etch Systems
R14-12 Related Documents
R14-12.1 DIN V VDE Standards
24
DIN V VDE 19250 — Control Technology; Functional
Safety Aspects to be Considered for Measurement and
Control Equipment
24 VDE-Verlag GmbH, Bismarkstrasse 33, 10625 Berlin, Germany,
www.vde.de
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RELATED INFORMATION 15
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
NOTICE: This related information is not an official part of SEMI S2. It was derived from editorial work by the
Fire Protection Task Force. This related information was approved for publication by Technical Ballot and formal
adjudication as an Effective date line item on March 18, 2004.
R15-1 Introduction
R15-1.1 Preventing discharges from occurring
accidentally and ensuring that systems are able to fulfill
their intended function requires attention to detail from
the specification of the system, through design,
installation and commissioning and then through on-
going maintenance.
R15-1.2 The following information is intended to assist
stakeholders involved in the process of designing,
installing, and maintaining fire protection of
semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Further
information can be found in the appropriate fire
protection codes and standards applicable to the type of
fire protection system and in related documents.
NOTE 1: The term “fire suppression” is limited to
extinguishing fire, once it has begun. The term “fire
protection” incorporates fire suppression and other means of
mitigating the risk of fires, including fire detection and
materials selection.
R15-1.3 The use of contractors with previous
experience in the design and installation of fire
protection of cleanrooms and semiconductor
manufacturing equipment is desirable.
R15-1.4 Independent third party review of fire
protection designs and installations by a fire protection
engineer with relevant experience can also help to
ensure that systems are correctly designed and installed.
NOTE 2: The material in this Related Information is
presented as additional guidance in designing, installing, and
maintaining fire protection systems in semiconductor
manufacturing equipment. Although this information is
believed to be useful in optimizing such systems, the material
in this Related Information does not comprise additional
criteria for determining conformance to the provisions of
SEMI S2 or SEMI S14.
R15-2 Design Review
R15-2.1 Ensure that system proposed uses approved or
listed components and that they are used within their
listing or approval, e.g., FM Approved wet bench fire
suppression systems should be used for open-faced wet
bench whereas an enclosed tool can use a system
comprising of FM approved & compatible components.
R15-2.2 Detection needs to be selected to suit the
working environment and the type of fire/smoke that is
anticipated. For example, optical detectors need to
have been tested and approved/listed for use with
specific flammable liquids or gases. Flames and smoke
from burning materials have varying physical
characteristics which mean that some detection devices
will not always react promptly.
R15-2.3 The location of detection devices in relation to
hazards needs to be carefully considered. A detector
that is located too close to a heat source may activate
when it sees normal process conditions rather than fire
conditions.
R15-2.4 Some optical detectors may also be
susceptible to accidental activation if they are exposed
to welding flashes. Care in detector selection can avoid
this, but implementing strict cutting and welding
working practices and permissions can also play an
important part.
R15-3 Installation Review
R15-3.1 Once completed by the fire protection
installer, the fire protection installation should be
inspected and reviewed by a competent and
experienced fire protection engineer. This review will:
R15-3.1.1 Verify installation against previously
working drawings.
R15-3.1.2 Ensure that specified equipment has been
installed as indicated on the working drawings and in
line with equipment approvals and listings.
R15-3.2 Distribution pipework networks should be
complete (including all connections), properly
supported using listed and approved equipment.
Frequent failures of piped systems, including CO
2
systems, occur due to incorrectly connected pipes or
where fittings have not been made or sufficiently
tightened.
R15-3.3 Supports for pipework should be able to
withstand the expected forces that will be experienced
during discharge of the suppression system. This is
important to protect personnel and property from
moving pipes in high-pressure systems using agents
such as carbon dioxide.
R15-3.4 Detection systems should have components
installed as per reviewed drawings, however it is not
always possible during desktop drawing review to
identify that detectors are correctly sited. As a result,