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SEMI S14-0704 © SEMI 2000, 2004 16 R3-6.3 Annual and sem i-annual maintenance sh ould be carried out by competent personnel with adequate training for the tasks in hand.

SEMI S14-0704 © SEMI 2000, 2004 15
the field review should concentrate on ensuring that
components are located so that they can see the hazard
without obstruction, including clear vision panels,
which may prevent detector from “seeing” the flame.
R3-3.5 Similarly detectors need to be sited so that they
will not experience normal process temperatures,
radiation or be exposed to chemical, liquid or particles
that could result in an accidental activation.
R3-3.6 Where linear heat detection cable is used it
should be located where it will not be exposed to levels
of ambient or process related heat that could trigger an
alarm signal. In addition the cable should be securely
attached to prevent it dislodging and coming into
contact with hot surfaces.
R3-3.7 Nozzle locations in many suppression systems
can be critical to ensuring functionality, reliability and
safety. For example, CO
2
nozzles incorrectly
positioned can result in chemical splashing or
dislodging product or quartzware. If nozzles are
exposed to chemical action including corrosive
chemicals, it is important that the materials are resistant
to the chemical
R3-3.8 Where automatic sprinkler heads are used, the
fusible link should be adequately protected from
chemical and mechanical attack.
R3-4 Commissioning Tests
R3-4.1 All installations should undergo a thorough
commissioning and acceptance test conducted by the
installer and witnessed by the owner or owner’s
representative.
R3-4.2 Functional Tests are essential, but not sufficient
to ensure that system will operate as in tended. The
types of problems that can be picked up by functional
testing are:
R3-4.2.1 Inability of detection system to detect as
intended,
R3-4.2.2 Inability of control system to receive signal
from individual detectors, and
R3-4.2.3 Inability of alarm panel to initiate system
discharge or send alarm signals to connected devices
and safety systems, e.g.,
• local or remote alarm panels,
• sounders & warning devices, and
• interlocks to equipment shutdown and safety
systems, EMO.
R3-4.3 Discharge Testing is the only way that we can
ensure that that a system will fulfill its intended
function. The types of problems that can be picked up
by discharge testing are:
R3-4.3.1 Lack of extinguishing agent
R3-4.3.2 Inability to transfer agent from supply to
nozzles due to:
• Blockages arising from incorrect equipment,
• Incomplete piping, loose fittings & supports, and
• Installation, design problems (e.g,. icing up of CO
2
pipes or nozzles).
R3-4.4 In many cases discharge testing within the
cleanroom environment is not considered acceptable or
practical. Accordingly, alternatives such as type testing
can prove that the design will provide the necessary
protection, but may need to be supplemented by a more
rigorous commissioning test of the final systems. Type
testing would involve the installation and discharge
testing of a system on a tool during manufacture or on a
mock up of the tool. The aim would be to prove that
distribution pipework and nozzles have been correctly
designed and that the concentration of agents and
distribution patterns from nozzles is acceptable. This
would be supplemented by additional tests on each
installation, including pressure tests of pipework and
“puff” tests to verify pipework integrity.
R3-5 Burn In
R3-5.1 In order to avoid unnecessary discharges, a
period of burn-in for the detection system is advisable.
This involves the detection system operating, enabling
detection of fires and initiation of alarms, but the
detection is not interlocked to shut down the process
equipment or initiate a discharge.
R3-5.2 A period of days or weeks may be appropriate
depending on the effect of an accidental activation of
the system in terms of interruption to processing,
damage to product or contamination of the
environment.
R3-6 Maintenance & Servicing
R3-6.1 Once systems are installed and commissioned it
is important that the routine inspection and maintenance
procedures recommended by manufacturers and those
required by codes and standards, are adequately
implemented.
R3-6.2 The inspection frequencies may need to be
modified if the ambient conditions can adversely affect
the protection systems. For example sprinkler heads
protecting corrosive fume exhaust ducts may need to be
inspected weekly or monthly until the appropriate
frequency for that particular system can be determined.

SEMI S14-0704 © SEMI 2000, 2004 16
R3-6.3 Annual and semi-annual maintenance should be
carried out by competent personnel with adequate
training for the tasks in hand.

SEMI S14-0704 © SEMI 2000, 2004 17
RELATED INFORMATION 4
DOCUMENTING EXPLOSION SAFETY FOR SEMICONDUCTOR
MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT
NOTICE: This related information is not an official part of SEMI S14 and was derived from the work of a member
of the Fire Protection Task Force of the North American Environmental, Health, and Safety Committee. This
related information was approved for publication by 2/3 committee vote on July 17, 2003.
R4-1 Introduction
R4-1.1 The design of many semiconductor
manufacturing machines has to take account of the
hazard created by the presence of flammable liquids
and gases and as a result the designer will usually have
identified the hazards and put in place the necessary
mitigation and protection measures to provide a
satisfactory level of safety.
R4-1.2 This document is intended to assist equipment
designers and third party evaluators in documenting the
presence of explosion hazards and detailing how they
have integrated explosion safety into the design.
R4-1.3 There are specific requirements with regard to
the prevention and mitigation of explosion risks within
many jurisdictions. However the theory of explosion
prevention and mitigation transcends jurisdictional
boundaries. While this document arises out of the need
for some equipment to satisfy the European Union
ATEX Directive (94/9/EC), it has been developed in
such as way that it will not only meet the requirement
to document the principles of integrated explosion
safety (Essential Health and Safety Requirement 1.0),
but will provide information to authorities having
jurisdiction (AHJs) in many other parts of the world.
R4-2 Documentation
R4-2.1 For all equipment using flammable liquids or
gases an Explosion Risk Document (ERD) should be
developed and issued as an appendix to the SEMI S14
Fire Risk Assessment Internal Report. (The main
explosion hazards, risks and mitigation features should
already be documented in the S14 Final and Summary
Reports.)
R4-2.2 The ERD should demonstrate that the
equipment designer and manufacturer have adopted an
integrated approach to explosion safety adequately
mitigating the risk of an explosion.
R4-2.3 The structure of the document is flexible,
however a logical structure should be adopted such as
that suggested by the headings and sections of this
document, e.g.,
• Design Philosophy and Equipment Operation
Overview,
• Hazard Identification,
• Mitigation Measures Implemented & Protection
Systems Integrated, and
• Residual Explosion Risk.
R4-3 Design Philosophy and Equipment
Operation Overview
R4-3.1 The intended purpose of the equipment should
be stated, along with its operating environment.
R4-3.2 A functional and technical overview of the
process should be provided, where it relates to the
flammable and explosive chemicals and gases. This
should include significant process parameters including
temperature, pressure, and quantities of relevant
chemicals and gases. The operating conditions and
control system faults that influence explosion safety
should be described.
R4-3.3 The explosion protection design philosophy
should be thoroughly documented listing the design
standards applied, and any significant deviations.
R4-3.4 The classification of hazardous areas or zoning
outside and inside equipment should be described
indicating the classification system used (e.g., EN1127-
1, NFPA 497).
R4-3.5 Where components and equipment are within
or are related to areas classified as hazardous, they
should be documented including manufacturers’ details,
listings and approvals and confirmation that they have
been used within the scope of the approvals and
listings.
R4-4 Hazard Identification
R4-4.1 It is good practice to adopt a comprehensive
approach to hazard identification when designing for
explosive atmospheres, especially for complicated
equipment, protective systems and components. If a
structured approach to hazard identification and risk
assessment has been taken, for example, if during the
design process a HAZOP has been undertaken, the
HAZOP itself should form part of the documentation
supporting this section.